Michigan Law Review
Volume 120

Issue 6

2022

“A Mystifying and Distorting Factor”: The Electoral College and
American Democracy
Katherine Shaw
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Election Law Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons

Recommended Citation
Katherine Shaw, “A Mystifying and Distorting Factor”: The Electoral College and American Democracy, 120
MICH. L. REV. 1285 (2022).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol120/iss6/19

https://doi.org/10.36644/mlr.120.6.mystifying
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

“A MYSTIFYING AND DISTORTING FACTOR”:
THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY
Katherine Shaw*
LET THE PEOPLE PICK THE PRESIDENT: THE CASE FOR ABOLISHING THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE. By Jesse Wegman. St. Martin’s Press. 2020.
Pp. viii, 296. $27.99.
INTRODUCTION
As the 2020 presidential election made clear, the Electoral College is a
profoundly dangerous institution. American constitutional democracy survived that election and its aftermath, emerging battered and bruised but still
standing. 1 But the Electoral College is in large part to blame for how close it
came to a fatal wound.
That’s true as a technical matter. Joe Biden won the national popular vote
by approximately seven million votes and prevailed in the Electoral College
306–232. 2 But just forty-four thousand more Trump votes across Arizona,
Georgia, and Wisconsin would have resulted in a 269–269 tie in the Electoral
College. 3 If that had happened, the House of Representatives, voting by state
delegation, would likely have handed Donald Trump the presidency. 4 That

* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. My thanks to Ned Foley, Chris
Hayes, and participants in Cardozo Law School’s summer workshop series for helpful comments
and suggestions; to Bella Pori for invaluable research assistance; and to the Michigan Law Review
for terrific editorial work.
1. Susan D. Hyde & Elizabeth N. Saunders, Opinion, Trump Didn’t Break Our Democracy. But Did He Fatally Weaken It?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com
/2020/12/15/opinion/trump-democracy-america.html [perma.cc/Z6GY-4NHY]; George Packer,
A Political Obituary for Donald Trump, ATLANTIC (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com
/magazine/archive/2021/01/the-legacy-of-donald-trump/617255 [perma.cc/3MKJ-JZPP].
2. Benjamin Swasey & Connie Hanzhang Jin, Narrow Wins in These Key States Powered
Biden to the Presidency, NPR (Dec. 2, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/12/02/940689086
/narrow-wins-in-these-key-states-powered-biden-to-the-presidency [perma.cc/4AD4-B3CE];
Caroline Linton, All 538 Electors Have Voted, Formalizing Biden’s 306-232 Win. Here’s How the
Electoral College Works., CBS NEWS (Dec. 15, 2020, 7:30 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news
/electoral-college-votes-joe-biden-victory [perma.cc/X6YA-WZV3].
3. Swasey & Jin, supra note 2.
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (“The person having the greatest number of votes for
President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors
appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives
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would have marked the third time in twenty years—and the second time in
two cycles—that our anachronistic system of presidential selection produced
a president who did not win the national popular vote. 5
Following the election, President Trump worked ruthlessly to convert loss
into victory, exploiting pressure points and ambiguities in the protracted and
complex process, partly constitutional and partly statutory, that we refer to
collectively as the Electoral College. Trump’s campaign filed numerous lawsuits 6 designed to delay state certification beyond the statutory “safe harbor”
deadline, after which a state’s slate of electors is no longer conclusive in the
event of a dispute. 7 Trump supporters attempted to disrupt the required meetings at which each state’s electors actually cast their votes. 8 Ersatz Trump
“electors” purported to cast competing votes in some states, seeking to lay the
groundwork for later challenges to official state slates. 9 Trump pressured state

shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall
be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote . . . .”).
5. In 2000, Al Gore won the national popular vote by just over five hundred thousand
votes, while losing Florida’s electoral votes and thus the presidency after the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). See David Stout, Gore’s Lead in the Popular Vote Now
Exceeds 500,000, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/30/us/43rd-president-final-tally-gore-s-lead-popular-vote-now-exceeds-500000.html [perma.cc/XP8R-8SWH].
In 2016, Hillary Clinton won the national popular vote by almost three million votes, while losing the Electoral College 304–227. Nate Cohn, Why Trump Had an Edge in the Electoral College,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/upshot/why-trump-had-anedge-in-the-electoral-college.html [perma.cc/HD2E-BUAJ].
6. Jacob Shamsian & Sonam Sheth, Trump and His Allies Filed More Than 40 Lawsuits
Challenging the 2020 Election Results. All of Them Failed., INSIDER (Feb. 22, 2021, 5:03 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-campaign-lawsuits-election-results-2020-11 [perma.cc
/F2JS-HW4X].
7. 3 U.S.C. § 5; see Edward B. Foley, Preparing for a Disputed Presidential Election: An
Exercise in Election Risk Assessment and Management, 51 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 309, 332–33 (2019).
8. The Twelfth Amendment directs that the electors “meet in their respective states and
vote by ballot for President and Vice-President.” U.S. CONST. amend. XII; 3 U.S.C. § 7.
9. Ronald J. Hansen, Fake Electors Try to Deliver Arizona’s 11 Votes for Trump, AZCENTRAL
(Dec. 14, 2020, 11:40 AM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/12/14
/arizona-groups-fake-electors-try-cast-11-electoral-votes-trump/6536056002 [perma.cc/8VQ2KFGH]; Deanna Paul, Republican Electors Cast Unofficial Ballots, Setting Up Congressional
Clash, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 28, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/republican-electorscast-unofficial-ballots-setting-up-congressional-clash-11609164000 [perma.cc/4KJR-P6V7];
Aishvarya Kavi, No, Republican Attempts to Organize ‘Alternate’ Electors Won’t Affect the Official
Electoral College Tally., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/14/us
/no-republican-attempts-to-organize-alternate-electors-wont-affect-the-official-electoral-college-tally.html [perma.cc/X795-GAFG] (quoting Trump advisor Stephen Miller’s statement that
“an alternate slate of electors in the contested states is going to vote and we are going to send
those results up to Congress”); see also Read: Trump Lawyer's Memo on Six-Step Plan for Pence
to Overturn the Election, CNN (Sept. 21, 2021, 8:20 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/21/politics/read-eastman-memo/index.html [perma.cc/CK7Y-C23U] (contending that “7 states have
transmitted dual slates of electors to the President of the Senate” and arguing that the vice president should use the existence of those slates to conclude that “there are no electors that can be
deemed validly appointed in those States”).
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election officials to “find” additional votes for him. 10 Trump loyalists in the
Department of Justice sought to push state legislatures to take the radical step
of discarding state returns on the basis of spurious fraud claims and appoint
Trump electors themselves. 11 Trump himself reportedly urged Vice President
Pence to refuse to count electoral votes from a number of states in which
Biden received more votes. 12 Most significantly, what became the January 6,
2021, attack on the Capitol was an effort to disrupt the final event in the Electoral College timeline: a joint session of Congress over which the vice president presides. 13
So the baroque and multistep process through which a candidate becomes
president afforded Trump a number of postelection opportunities to contest
or undermine, in terms framed in law and legal process, the results of an election he had plainly lost. 14 Might the College have also played a more subtle
role in these events? That is, might its very existence have served to undermine
the health and resilience of our system in ways that made us more susceptible
to Trump’s efforts to subvert democracy and the rule of law?
Consider here the political rhetoric around presidential elections, which,
because of the College, frames elections more as complex puzzles or logic
games than as singularly important moments in self-governance. We discuss
“paths to 270”; 15 on election night, pundits like MSNBC’s Steve Kornacki manipulate touch screens, enabling them with a wave of the index finger to fundamentally change our destiny (“What if we throw in NE-2?,” “He’s really got
to run up the score in Broward County,” etc.). Consider as well the way the
College’s winner-take-all logic means that we color code the country in red
10. See Transcript: President Trump’s Phone Call with Georgia Election Officials, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/03/us/politics/trump-raffenspergergeorgia-call-transcript.html [perma.cc/29RX-SZ63].
11. MAJORITY STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 117TH CONG., SUBVERTING
JUSTICE: HOW THE FORMER PRESIDENT AND HIS ALLIES PRESSURED DOJ TO OVERTURN THE
2020 ELECTION (2021), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Interim%20Staff%20
Report%20FINAL.pdf [perma.cc/V9ML-J7P7]; H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM, 117TH
CONG., SELECTED DOCUMENTS: PRESIDENT TRUMP PRESSURE CAMPAIGN ON DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE (2021), https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/COR-SelectedDOJDocuments-2021-6-15-FINAL.pdf [perma.cc/XZ4A-8Y96].
12. Michael S. Schmidt, Trump Says Pence Can Overturn His Loss in Congress. That’s Not
How It Works., N.Y. TIMES (Jan 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/05/us/politics/pence-trump-election.html [perma.cc/J6B8-FUCX].
13. See U.S. CONST. art. II; id. amend. XII; 3 U.S.C. § 15.
14. Cf. Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 547 (2018)
(“[A]utocrats who hijack constitutions seek to benefit from the superficial appearance of both
democracy and legality.”).
15. This sort of language appeared in numerous statements seeking to rationalize
Trump’s efforts: as late as mid-December, when some of Trump’s congressional allies finally
acknowledged that Joe Biden would be the next president, Trump loyalist Lindsey Graham continued to maintain that Trump still had a “narrow path” to retaining the presidency. See, e.g.,
Marianne Levine, Burgess Everett & Andrew Desiderio, ‘Time for Everybody to Move On’:
Senate GOP Accepts Biden’s Win, POLITICO (Dec. 14, 2020, 7:23 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/14/senate-republicans-biden-win-445309 [perma.cc/S3UU-HHMT].
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and blue, eliding the fact that Americans of all political identities reside in
every county and every state. This coding may well have primed a portion of
the electorate to accept outlandish claims of election fraud when a state like
Georgia, one that had for decades been reliably “red,” shifted to the “blue”
column. 16 Perhaps all of this helped lay the groundwork for President Trump’s
stratagems after November 3—or at least lulled the country for a time into
thinking that there was nothing wildly anomalous about a process in which
an obviously defeated candidate delayed and exploited pressure points in a
desperate attempt to cling to power.
It is tempting to dismiss these events as largely attributable to the identity
of the incumbent president and not as fundamentally connected to the Electoral College. Certainly, any electoral system can be targeted by a sufficiently
determined aspiring autocrat. But as Jesse Wegman’s Let the People Pick the
President: The Case for Abolishing the Electoral College 17 makes clear, not only
questions of democratic legitimacy but also the specter of chaos and manipulation have stalked the Electoral College from the beginning (pp. 58, 86–102).
Wegman has contributed an important work to the literature calling for
Electoral College reform. His book is an accessible, short, and almost breezy
read. But to its credit, it doesn’t oversimplify; it’s a deeply sophisticated exploration of the central pathologies of this key feature of the American political
and constitutional landscape. The book’s urgency has only increased since its
publication in March 2020. One hopes that this urgency is not lost as President
Trump’s tumultuous departure from office fades from view. While Trump
was emphatically wrong in the particulars of his attack on the 2020 election,
there is something deeply broken in our system of presidential selection. Perhaps an unexpected legacy of Donald Trump’s presidency will be finally galvanizing us to fix it.
Part I of this Review describes the origins of the Electoral College. Part II
assesses the College’s performance over 235 years: routinely misfiring, the
subject of a staggering number of constitutional amendment efforts, and likely
responsible for exacerbating—if not causing—polarization, dysfunction, and
division. Finally, Part III assesses prospects for Electoral College reform, including the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact.
I.

THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE: ORIGINS

We use the term “Electoral College” to describe our scheme of presidential selection, but those words do not appear in the Constitution. 18 The process, however, does. Indeed, more of Article II, which creates and empowers
the office of the presidency, is devoted to presidential selection (together with
16. See Perry Bacon Jr., How Georgia Turned Blue, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 18, 2020, 12:20
PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-georgia-turned-blue [perma.cc/HLN3-8KUB].
17. Jesse Wegman is a member of the New York Times editorial board.
18. Indeed, although there were scattered uses of the term in the Founding Era, it did not
enter the lexicon as shorthand for our system of presidential selection until the twentieth century.
See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, WHY DO WE STILL HAVE THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE? 393–94 (2020).
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removal and succession) than to presidential governance. 19 The relevant constitutional language provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner
as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole
Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in
the Congress.” 20 It then sets forth a multistep process in which the electors are
to “meet in their respective States” to “vote by Ballot for two Persons,” then
transmit those sealed votes “to the Seat of Government of the United States,”
where the president of the Senate “shall, in the presence of the Senate and
House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then
be counted.” 21 Following this counting, the individual with the most votes becomes president and the runner-up vice president. 22 If no candidate commands
a majority, the House chooses the president, with each state delegation having
one vote, and the runner-up becomes vice president, unless there’s a tie for
the number two spot, in which case the Senate chooses the vice president. 23
Phew. So how did this Rube Goldberg scheme come to be included in the
Constitution? There is evidence in the records of the Constitutional Convention to support a number of distinct origin stories: an elitist fear of too much
democracy and a perceived need to create some mediating body; a desire to
maximize slave-state power; 24 a response to small states’ concerns that presidential selection not be dominated by a few large states; or simply a byproduct
of delegate exhaustion and resignation after months of stalemate. Wegman
acknowledges that each of these accounts captures a real dynamic at play in
Philadelphia in the summer of 1787, but the narrative he offers mostly supports the final theory—that the best reading of drafting history is that the Electoral College was a hasty, eleventh-hour solution to one of the most vexing
problems the drafters faced, arrived at by delegates who initially punted on
this difficult question and then simply ran out of time to craft a more elegant
solution. 25
The protagonist of this portion of the book is James Wilson, a leading
revolutionary thinker who had been educated in Scotland at the height of the
Scottish Enlightenment, and who, on Wegman’s telling, brought to the Convention a profound commitment to popular sovereignty. 26 Although not
19. In Wegman’s apt description, the 346 words that create the College constitute “the
longest, most convoluted clause in the whole charter.” P. 58.
20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
21. Id.
22. Id. cl. 3.
23. Id. These final provisions were subsequently altered by the Twelfth Amendment.
24. Paul Finkelman, The Proslavery Origins of the Electoral College, 23 CARDOZO L. REV.
1145 (2002); Akhil Reed Amar, Opinion, Actually, The Electoral College Was a Pro-slavery Ploy,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/06/opinion/electoral-collegeslavery.html [perma.cc/W5WV-RNLR].
25. Pp. 57–58. The subtitle of Wegman’s “Origins” chapter is “A Last-Minute ‘Frankenstein Compromise.’ ”
26. P. 48. One senses that a subsidiary goal of Wegman’s book is a restoration of Wilson
to his rightful place in constitutional history—much like that recently experienced by Alexander
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nearly as well-known as other leading lights of the Founding generation, 27
Wilson was a key constitutional architect and a vocal participant at the Convention (p. 48), and he was singularly focused on the office of the presidency.
Throughout the Convention he argued for a single chief executive—a number
of delegates supported the creation of a plural executive 28—and he urged, initially with no support, direct popular election of that executive (pp. 62–63).
After the Convention had forged its compromises around the legislature,
attention turned back to presidential selection, which Wilson described as “in
truth the most difficult of all on which we have had to decide.” 29 By now Wilson had gained the support of important players, including James Madison
and Gouverneur Morris, for his position that the president “ought to be
elected by the people at large” (p. 68). Opponents raised a range of concerns:
some were grounded in obvious disdain for the masses, 30 while others turned
on practical concerns about the challenges of informed choice in a genuinely
national election. 31 The delegates debated a number of alternative methods,
including giving the power to pick the president to Congress, 32 state legislatures, or even governors. 33
Agreement proved elusive, 34 and eventually a committee of eleven delegates 35 was convened to address several thorny remaining issues, including

Hamilton, with whom Wilson shared an immigrant story, fortune and acclaim as a young lawyer, a central role in the framing of the Constitution, and an eventual fall into disgrace. See William Ewald, James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 901, 903–
04, 912–15 (2008).
27. Ewald, supra note 26, at 902 (“[R]elative to the magnitude of his accomplishments,
[Wilson] has a good claim to be the most neglected of the major American founders.”).
28. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
215–17 (2016) (describing one proposal for a plural executive composed of “three men to be chosen from different regions of the country”).
29. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 501 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1966).
30. Elbridge Gerry, for example, openly derided the people’s ignorance. KLARMAN, supra
note 28, at 228.
31. P. 68 (“In late eighteenth-century America, education was limited, transportation was
slow, and mass communication was almost unheard of. Under these conditions, it was difficult
for most people to get any reliable information about candidates beyond their local districts, and
the framers feared that they would be inclined to vote for a charlatan, a smooth talker who was
unfit to hold such a powerful job.”).
32. NEAL R. PEIRCE & LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY, THE PEOPLE’S PRESIDENT: THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND THE DIRECT VOTE ALTERNATIVE 19 (Yale
Univ. Press rev. ed. 1981) (1968).
33. See KLARMAN, supra note 28, at 229.
34. MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, THE PRESIDENT WHO WOULD NOT BE KING 54 (2020)
(“The delegates spent far more time debating how the president would be chosen, the length of
his term, and the method of removal than they did debating presidential powers.”).
35. See p. 73. This committee is alternately referred to as the “Committee on Unfinished
Parts,” the “Committee on Postponed Matters,” and the “Committee of Eleven.” See John R.
Vile, The Critical Role of Committees at the U.S. Constitutional Convention of 1787, 48 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 147, 169–70 (2006); Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2320 (2020).
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presidential selection. This Committee returned with a draft that created a
unitary president who would serve a four-year term and be eligible for reelection. But, importantly, that executive would not be popularly elected; rather,
he would be chosen by special “electors,” appointed in each state in a manner
chosen by the state legislature—an idea Wilson had floated several times previously. Each state’s elector allocation would match its seats in Congress
(House and Senate combined), thus importing into presidential selection the
same advantage that small states and slave states enjoyed in congressional representation. This new proposal was adopted nearly unanimously with only
one small modification: giving the House (with states voting by delegation)
rather than the Senate the power to resolve elections in which no candidate
received a majority (pp. 74–75, 79).
Of course, the origins of this scheme—ignominious, slapdash, misguided,
all of the above—don’t settle the role or value of the College today. But the
history Wegman distills offers a powerful answer to the common critique that
Electoral College reform would be inconsistent with the Framers’ design and
desires. At best, the scheme was chosen because it was deemed “on the whole
to be liable to fewest objections” 36—not because, in the considered judgment
of the Constitution’s drafters, it was the best way to choose a president.
Soon after the Convention, however, the spinning began. Perhaps the
most famous Founding Era discussion of the College appears in Federalist 68,
attributed to Alexander Hamilton. One senses a hint of defensiveness in Hamilton’s insistence that the Constitution’s “mode of appointment” of the president was, if “not perfect, . . . at least excellent.”37
Hamilton’s rhetoric was clearly post hoc justification. Yet Federalist 68
remains the foundational text in a particular mythology of the Electoral College, the continuing allure of which Wegman highlights throughout his book.
In reality, however, the Electoral College’s flaws have been both evident and
widely acknowledged virtually from the beginning.
II.

MISFIRES, DISTORTION, AND EFFORTS AT REFORM

Hamilton’s rosy characterization aside, many leading early thinkers—including Hamilton himself—quickly began to harbor doubts about the Constitution’s system of presidential selection. 38 Both private exchanges and public
36. James Madison, Speech in the Federal Convention on Electing the Executive (July 19,
1787), in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 127, 128 (Jack Rakove ed., 1999).
37. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton). The document goes on to argue that
that the system sought to create “every practicable obstacle . . . to cabal, intrigue, and corruption,” by conferring the power to choose the president on “men most capable of analyzing the
qualities adapted to the station” and guaranteeing that the office of President will never fall to
any man who is not “endowed with the requisite qualifications.” Id.
38. Such doubts were not limited to the College; indeed, a recent book argues that “the
founders themselves were, particularly by the end of their lives, far less confident in the merits
of the political system that they had devised, and . . . many of them in fact deemed it an utter
failure that was unlikely to last beyond their own generation.” DENNIS C. RASMUSSEN, FEARS OF
A SETTING SUN 3 (2021).
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debate in the post-Founding decades make clear how deeply contested the
College was in those years. In an 1816 letter, Thomas Jefferson proposed
amending the Constitution to provide for “an Executive chosen by the people.” 39 Madison also expressed reservations, 40 referring to the House’s role in
presidential selection as an “evil” and a “great . . . departure from the republican principle of numerical equality” (p. 99). In 1816, Pennsylvania senator
Abner Lacock introduced the first of many proposals to abolish the College
outright and replace it with a national popular vote (p. 99). Wegman’s cataloguing of these developments dovetails with recent scholarship suggesting
that the post-Founding period was an important one for establishing the
meaning of the Constitution, such that congressional and public elaboration
during that time should be understood as a “crucial second phase” of constitutional creation. 41 In the case of the Electoral College, however, this period
appears to have been more one of unsettling than of creation. Over time, the
College’s shortcomings and dangers have become still more apparent.
A. Mistakes and Misfires
Doubts about the College’s design flaws were not abstract. The elections
of 1796 and 1800 saw challenges created by the runner-up system for selecting
the vice president: in 1796, the installation of political rivals as governing
partners; in 1800, a tied vote. 42 The Twelfth Amendment sprang out of a need
to avoid these predicaments in the future, requiring electors to cast separate
votes for president and vice president. 43 But it otherwise left intact the system
of presidential selection, which has five times anointed as president someone
who did not receive the most votes from the public.

39. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 10 THE PAPERS
THOMAS JEFFERSON: RETIREMENT SERIES; 1 MAY 1816 TO 18 JANUARY 1817, at 222, 225 (J.
Jefferson Looney ed., 2013). As he explained, “in truth, the abuses of monarchy had so much
filled all the space of political contemplation that we imagined every thing republican which was
not monarchy. [W]e had not yet penetrated to the mother-principle that ‘governments are republican only in proportion as they embody the will of their people.” Id.
40. Joseph J. Ellis, Opinion, Even the Founders Hated the Electoral College, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 22, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-11-22/electoral-college-popular-vote-founders-james-madison-great-compromise [perma.cc/MY48-YKZZ].
41. Maeve Glass, Fixing America’s Founding, 118 MICH. L. REV. 949, 950 (2019) (reviewing JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN
THE FOUNDING ERA (2018)).
42. Joshua D. Hawley, The Transformative Twelfth Amendment, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1501, 1545 (2014).
43. Id. at 1548; Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2319 (2020) (“Ratified at the start
of the 19th century, the Twelfth Amendment both acknowledged and facilitated the Electoral
College’s emergence as a mechanism not for deliberation but for party-line voting.”); EDWARD
B. FOLEY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND MAJORITY RULE: THE RISE, DEMISE, AND POTENTIAL
RESTORATION OF THE JEFFERSONIAN ELECTORAL COLLEGE 27–45 (2020).
OF
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The first was the election of 1824, in which Andrew Jackson defeated John
Quincy Adams 41 percent to 31 percent in the popular vote and by a comfortable margin in the Electoral College. However, the presence of two other presidential candidates meant that Jackson did not receive a majority in the
College (p. 100). As it had in 1800, the House selected the president, this time
choosing Adams in a voting process that was much swifter, but if anything
more controversial, than in 1800. 44
The 1876 election was a moment of even more profound crisis, resulting
in not just the installation of the popular-vote loser but the end of Reconstruction. Democratic candidate Samuel Tilden was the clear winner of the popular
vote but fell short of an Electoral College majority (p. 110). Electoral votes in
four states remained in dispute for months, with neither the Constitution nor
federal law providing any clear mechanism for resolving them. Congress finally created a fifteen-member commission that awarded all the disputed
votes, and thus the presidency, to Republican Rutherford Hayes. 45 The election of 1888 saw another such split, with Grover Cleveland winning a plurality
of the popular vote but Benjamin Harrison securing a majority in the Electoral
College and thus the presidency (pp. 116–17).
Elections after 1888 managed to align the popular and Electoral College
votes for some time, but “popular vote” is somewhat misleading in this period.
The end of Reconstruction meant that the notorious Three-Fifths Clause
functionally became a “five-fifths” clause: African Americans in the post-Reconstruction South were counted for purposes of representation, including in
the College, but were unable to vote, the Fifteenth Amendment notwithstanding. 46 The 1968 election, the first election following the enactment of the Voting Rights Act, was again nearly thrown to the House after third-party
segregationist candidate George Wallace siphoned off nearly ten million votes
and forty-six electoral votes (pp. 148–50). Although Richard Nixon managed
to defeat Hubert Humphrey in the popular vote and to secure an Electoral College victory, only seventy-eight thousand votes stood between the country and
a president selected by the House for the first time since 1824 (pp. 148–50).
Over the last two decades, the trend of popular and Electoral College vote
splits has accelerated to an alarming degree. Two of the last six elections, those
44. P. 100. Some scholars question the inclusion of the 1824 election in the list of “misfires,” because some states’ practice of legislative appointment meant there was no nationwide
popular vote from which to assess potential deviation. Norman R. Williams, Reforming the Electoral College: Federalism, Majoritarianism, and the Perils of Subconstitutional Change, 100 GEO.
L.J. 173, 185 n.52 (2011). To my mind, Jackson’s clear victory in both recorded popular vote and
electoral votes makes this an example of College breakdown.
45. EDWARD B. FOLEY, BALLOT BATTLES: THE HISTORY OF DISPUTED ELECTIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 117–49 (2016); Franita Tolson, In the Messiest Contested Election, One Man Saved
the System from Itself, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/03/us/samuel-randall-1876-election.html [perma.cc/V7NU-SBMU]. That election spurred the passage of
the Electoral Count Act, the 1887 statute that aims to resolve some of the Constitution’s ambiguities but arguably introduces still more uncertainty and instability into the process. See FOLEY,
supra, at 152.
46. KEYSSAR, supra note 18, at 9–10.
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held in 2000 and 2016, produced a split between the popular vote and the
Electoral College vote. 47 Two others came unnervingly close to that result: In
2004, incumbent George W. Bush won a 286–251 victory in the Electoral College, but if fewer than sixty thousand Bush voters in Ohio had switched their
votes to John Kerry, Kerry would have become the president despite a popular
vote loss of approximately three million. 48 And just tens of thousands of
changed votes in a few key states would have handed Trump the presidency
in 2020 despite a popular vote loss of approximately seven million. 49
Taken together, these events amount to an astonishingly high rate of error
and uncertainty. 50 And even when the College does not award the presidency
to the loser of the popular vote or take us to the brink of national crisis, it
profoundly impacts presidential campaigning and governance, as well as the
grammar and vocabulary of our political debates.
B. Distortion and Dysfunction
Under both the original Constitution and the Twelfth Amendment, states
are free to appoint their electors as they choose, and in the early years many
state legislatures assigned that power to themselves (pp. 92–94). But by 1860,
every state allowed its voters to choose their electors. 51 The Constitution is
silent on how electors are awarded within states, and today forty-eight states
use a winner-take-all system in which the state’s full slate of electors votes for
the winner of the state’s popular vote (p. 98). Two states, Maine and Nebraska,

47. See p. 2; see also supra note 5.
48. Peter Fenn, Has the Electoral College Outlived Its Usefulness?, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 11,
2012, 3:25 PM), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/peter-fenn/2012/10/11/electoral-college-lets-obama-romney-ignore-80-percent-of-america [perma.cc/6HVN-74LJ].
49. See Swasey & Jin, supra note 2.
50. See Jamelle Bouie, Opinion, The Electoral College Is the Greatest Threat to Our Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/28/opinion/the-electoralcollege.html [perma.cc/66RG-B57Q] (“The history of the Electoral College . . . is of Americans
working around the institution, grafting majoritarian norms and procedures onto the political
process and hoping, every four years, for a sensible outcome. And on an almost regular schedule,
it has done just the opposite.”).
51. One hundred and sixty years of history evidently did not stop members of President
Trump’s 2020 team from seeking to persuade legislatures to make those appointments directly.
Barton Gellman, The Election That Could Break America, ATLANTIC (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www
.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/11/what-if-trump-refuses-concede/616424 [perma.cc
/A2QM-DEGU] (quoting a state Republican Party leader reporting conversations about legislative appointment with the Trump national campaign). Although the Constitution does permit states
to choose legislative appointment, it’s highly doubtful that a state legislature could claw back the
power to choose electors after giving that power to individuals, and it seems clear that it could not
do so after the people had voted. NAT’L TASK FORCE ON ELECTION CRISES, A STATE LEGISLATURE
CANNOT APPOINT ITS PREFERRED SLATE OF ELECTORS TO OVERRIDE THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE
AFTER THE ELECTION, https://www.electiontaskforce.org/s/State_Legislature_Paper.pdf [perma.cc
/7Z2T-K6E5].
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do things somewhat differently, awarding two electoral votes to the state popular-vote winner, and one electoral vote to the popular-vote winner in each
congressional district (p. 98).
In our two-party system, winner-take-all means that most states are “safe”
for either the Democratic or Republican candidate, and a shifting set of
“swing” or “battleground” states decides the outcome of the election. A subset
of states thus assume outsized importance, as do the issues of importance to the
voters in those states. As Professor Lawrence Lessig points out, many more
Americans work in solar energy than work in coal,52 but because most solar jobs
are in the safe states of California (Democratic) and Texas (Republican, at least
so far), solar energy as a policy issue is virtually absent from presidential campaign debates and discourse. Coal, by contrast, remains important in the crucial battleground state of Pennsylvania, and presidential candidates thus spend
considerable time answering coal questions and formulating coal policy. 53 Presidential candidates also visit battleground states at much higher rates during
campaigns; apart from fundraising, they rarely set foot in states they have no
realistic shot of winning. 54 The national neglect of safe states can have significant consequences for state party operations, turnout (which can be crucial
for down-ballot races), and broader political participation (pp. 169–70).
This skewed emphasis also impacts governance. Political scientists Douglas Kriner and Andrew Reeves have shown that “the compulsion for presidents to court swing state voters does not end when the election is over.” 55
Rather, because of the Electoral College and winner-take-all, presidents pursue policies with an eye to their own electoral fortunes rather than the national
interest. 56 This dynamic was on full display during the Trump administration.
An aide reported that Trump sought to withhold federal disaster aid after California’s devastating 2018 wildfires, citing the state’s lack of political support
for him. 57 In the early days of COVID-19, Trump downplayed the seriousness

52. Harvard L. Sch., The Electoral College: Keynote Luncheon with Lawrence Lessig and
Stuart Stevens, YOUTUBE (Oct. 21, 2019), https://youtu.be/PPxwAPS_1S4; U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
U.S. ENERGY AND EMPLOYMENT REPORT 37, 40 (2017), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files
/2017/01/f34/2017%20US%20Energy%20and%20Jobs%20Report_0.pdf [perma.cc/ZNJ6-A49D].
53. Harvard L. Sch., supra note 52.
54. In the 2016 presidential election, for example, 94 percent of campaign events were
held in twelve states, and two-thirds of those events occurred in just six swing states. See Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE,
https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/written-explanation [perma.cc/VZ6N-SRFX].
55. DOUGLAS L. KRINER & ANDREW REEVES, THE PARTICULARISTIC PRESIDENT:
EXECUTIVE BRANCH POLITICS AND POLITICAL INEQUALITY 2 (2015).
56. Douglas Kriner & Andrew Reeves, The Electoral College and Presidential Particularism, 94 B.U. L. REV. 741, 753–65 (2014).
57. Noah Bierman & Eli Stokols, Trump Sought to Withhold California Fire Aid Because
of Politics, Former Official Says, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2020, 2:06 PM), https://www.latimes.com
/politics/story/2020-08-17/trump-sought-to-withhold-california-fire [perma.cc/DZ8N-BNGR].
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of the pandemic on the explicit grounds that its early impact was most severe
in blue states. 58
In addition to selectively advantaging a subset of states, the College also
systematically advantages smaller states, an effect that becomes more acute the
longer we go without increasing the size of the House. Wyoming’s three electoral votes translate to approximately one vote for every 192,000 residents of
the state; California’s fifty-five votes translate to approximately one for every
719,000 residents. 59
In many ways, the Electoral College system is the worst of all possible
worlds. But because individuals do cast votes in the states, the system has the
superficial features of a participatory democracy, allowing us to indulge the
fiction that the president is popularly elected. This fiction is quite dangerous,
with concrete consequences even beyond the electoral sphere. One such consequence, though outside the scope of Wegman’s book, is the way it permits
the Supreme Court to wield the idea of the president as popularly elected as a
cudgel against institutions or mechanisms that might act as checks on the
president. 60 Consider the 2020 decision Seila Law v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the most recent successful effort by proponents of the so-called
“unitary executive” theory. 61 In invalidating the CFPB’s single-member director structure as an intolerable encroachment upon the president’s Article II
authority, the Seila Court relied heavily upon the Framers’ decision to confer
on the president “[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch” that “characterise
the proceedings of one man.” 62 The opinion acknowledged that this sort of
intensely concentrated power was “unique in our constitutional structure,”
but insisted that there was no reason for concern, because the people acted as
the ultimate check on the president: “[T]he Framers made the President the
most democratic and politically accountable official in Government. Only the

58. Peter Baker, For Trump, It’s Not the United States, It’s Red and Blue States, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/17/us/politics/trump-america.html [perma
.cc/A2MT-XGPL].
59. See Brynn Epstein & Daphne Lofquist, U.S. Census Bureau Today Delivers State Population Totals for Congressional Apportionment, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Apr. 26, 2021), https://
www.census.gov/library/stories/2021/04/2020-census-data-release.html [perma.cc/2AND-LYLP];
see also Nick Routley, These Powerful Maps Show the Extremes of U.S. Population Density,
VISUAL CAPITALIST (Apr. 21, 2021), https://www.visualcapitalist.com/maps-extremes-us-population-density [perma.cc/WQ86-WUSR] (illustrating the relevant population-density dynamics).
60. Cf. Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce
Ackerman’s Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759, 762 (1992) (book review)
(describing Ackerman’s theory of the “plebiscitarian Presidency” as one where “presidential
elections . . . are widely perceived to confer substantive mandates on the successful candidate”).
61. 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
62. See Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2203 (alteration in original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70
(Alexander Hamilton)).
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President . . . is elected by the entire Nation. And the President’s political accountability is enhanced by the solitary nature of the Executive Branch, which
provides ‘a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people.’ ” 63
This is, of course, facially untrue. Although presidents (along with vice
presidents) are the only elected officials with a national constituency, they are
not in fact selected by the “entire nation.” The Court’s statement was particularly puzzling because it came just one week after the decision in Chiafalo v.
Washington, in which the Court upheld state laws that permit states to enforce
elector pledges to support their parties’ presidential candidates. 64 Justice Kagan, who dissented in Seila, began the unanimous Chiafalo opinion by reminding readers (and perhaps her colleagues) that the votes Americans cast
every four years “actually go toward selecting members of the Electoral College . . . . Those few ‘electors’ then choose the President.” 65
C. Previous Attempts to Fix the College
The Electoral College endures to this day, but not for lack of efforts to
reform or abolish it. Wegman identifies over seven hundred such efforts, beginning in the decades immediately following the Founding, continuing
through the first formal consideration of abolition in 1816, and coming closest
to fruition in 1970. 66
On Wegman’s telling, 1970 was an agonizing defeat. The effort began in
1965 when President Lyndon Johnson, spurred by the possibility that rogue
or “faithless” electors might pose a serious threat to a presidential election featuring a third-party candidate, asked Senator Birch Bayh to take up the issue
of Electoral College reform. 67 Bayh agreed, initially exploring only modest reforms. His first proposal would have retained the basic structure of the College
but eliminated actual electors, and thus the prospect of rogue electors (p. 143).
His attention next turned to mandating that states award electors using methods other than winner-take-all (pp. 143–44). After holding hearings and studying the issue, however, Bayh came to believe that the Constitution should be
amended to provide for direct popular election of the president, a position
that he announced in a rousing speech on the Senate floor (p. 145).

63. Id.; see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499
(2010) (“The Constitution requires that a President chosen by the entire Nation oversee the
execution of the laws.”).
64. 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2320 (2020).
65. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2319.
66. Pp. 92–97; see also Williams, supra note 44, at 175 (“In the past two centuries, more
proposed constitutional amendments have sought to replace or reform the Electoral College
than any other feature of our constitutional order.”).
67. Pp. 141–142. Bayh had been the principal drafter of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,
and Johnson approached him in the wake of that successful effort. Pp. 141–42; see also John D.
Feerick, Presidential Succession and Inability: Before and After the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 907, 923 (2010).
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Bayh’s change of heart happened as the Supreme Court was in the process
of radically reforming legislative representation through its one-person, onevote cases. Wegman suggests that this may have primed the public for receptivity to Bayh’s proposal; the design of the College, with its malapportionment
of political power, is flatly inconsistent with the logic of political equality that
underlies the one-person, one-vote cases (p. 140). Indeed, in 1966, when Bayh
first introduced an amendment to abolish the College, popular support for
that amendment was at 63 percent. 68
Bayh’s proposal gained momentum in 1967 and 1968. The 1968 election,
in which third-party candidate George Wallace won nearly enough electoral
votes to throw the election to the House, galvanized additional support for
reform (pp. 148–52). In September 1969, Bayh’s amendment passed the
House overwhelmingly by a vote of 339–70 (p. 153). But within a year it was
dead in the Senate, a victim of the filibuster that had nearly defeated the Civil
Rights and Voting Rights Acts just a few years earlier. This time, however, the
southern Democrats behind the filibuster had unlikely allies: Black and Jewish
lawmakers from New York, then a swing state, who became convinced that
they would be consigned to electoral irrelevance if the country moved to direct
popular election, and who serve as a cautionary tale about the importance of
taking the long view when it comes to the Electoral College (pp. 155–59).
The concern about faithless electors that inspired this nearly successful
amendment has been with us since the beginning. 69 And although the possibility of elector defection has loomed larger than the reality of rogue electors,
the 2016 election saw the live prospect of elector faithlessness as a genuine
force in elections—in that case, deployed in the same spirit of reform that animated Bayh nearly half a century earlier. Wegman’s book begins with one of
these electors: 2016 Clinton elector Michael Baca, who styled himself a “Hamilton elector” after Donald Trump’s unexpected victory and sought to foment
a wave of elector defections that would deny Trump the presidency (pp. 2–4).
Although the movement Baca sought to spark has largely faded from memory,
it was a serious effort: Wegman pulls from the vault a star-studded video exhortation to electors to vote for someone, anyone, other than Donald Trump.
The video opens with a direct-to-camera address by The West Wing’s Martin
Sheen: “Republican members of the electoral college, this message is for
you . . . . [O]ur Founding Fathers built the Electoral College to safeguard the
American people from the dangers of a demagogue.” Additional stars plead
with electors to “vot[e their] conscience on December 19.” 70

68. KEYSSAR, supra note 18, at 384–86.
69. Wegman cites a Federalist elector who betrayed the expectation of party loyalty in
1796 and instead cast his vote for Thomas Jefferson, inspiring an indignant letter to the editor:
“What, do I choose Samuel Miles to determine for me whether John Adams or Thomas Jefferson
shall be president? No! I choose him to act, not to think.” P. 82.
70. Julia Zorthian, These Celebrities Are Urging the Electoral College to Dump Donald
Trump, TIME (Dec. 15, 2016, 9:34 AM), https://time.com/4603254/celebrities-electoral-collegedonald-trump-video [perma.cc/V6NW-488Y].
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The effort was unsuccessful, of course. In the end, only Baca and nine
others, many of them Clinton rather than Trump electors, sought to cast their
votes for individuals other than the popular-vote winner in their respective
states. Seven such electors succeeded in casting those votes; Baca and two
other “faithless” elector had their votes invalidated by state laws requiring
electors to vote consistent with state returns (pp. 9–10). Those electors subsequently filed a lawsuit seeking the Supreme Court’s blessing for a Hamiltonian
vision of elector independence. The Court unanimously rejected that position
in Chiafalo v. Washington, hewing closely to a 1952 opinion that had upheld
elector-pledge laws. 71 The Chiafalo opinion noted that under the Electoral
College as it has evolved, “electors are not free agents; they are to vote for the
candidate whom the State’s voters have chosen.” 72 Ending on a note of popular sovereignty—a law binding electors “accords with the Constitution as well
as with the trust of a Nation that here, We the People rule” 73—Chiafalo was
both clear-eyed about the distinctly un-Hamiltonian character of electors and
the College today and may have represented an important salvo in the looming fights about the so-called “independent state legislature doctrine.” 74
Chiafalo was decided just months before the presidential election of 2020.
If the Court had vindicated elector independence and the electoral vote had
been tied, an active campaign of elector lobbying would surely have ensued;
faithless electors might have changed the outcome of the election for the first
time in American history. But even without a Supreme Court endorsement of
a constitutionally grounded right to elector independence, increased public
awareness of the possibility of elector independence after the 2016 election,
together with the collapse of many of the norms of political culture, could well
mean that future elections are more susceptible to disruption from large-scale
faithlessness by rogue electors. 75

71. 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020); see Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952) (finding “no federal constitutional objection” to Alabama’s elector-pledge law); id. at 234 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (describing the Electoral College as “a mystifying and distorting factor in presidential elections
which may resolve a popular defeat into an electoral victory” and arguing that its abolition would
be “a gain for [the] simplicity and integrity of our governmental processes”).
72. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2328.
73. Id.
74. See Republican Party of Pa. v. Degraffenreid, 141 S. Ct. 732, 738 (2021) (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing “whether the Elections or Electors Clauses . . . are violated when a state
court holds that a state constitutional provision overrides a state statute governing the manner
in which a federal election is to be conducted” as “an important and recurring constitutional
question” (citations omitted)).
75. Indeed, increasing the chances of broad electoral reform seems to have been at least
one goal of the litigation team behind the suit. Professor Lawrence Lessig, who argued the case,
told Professor Richard Hasen that he hoped “the uncertainty created by the case would create
the necessary groundswell of public support for either an amendment or the compact.” Richard
L. Hasen, The Coming Reckoning over the Electoral College, SLATE (Sept. 4, 2019, 11:08 AM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/09/electoral-college-supreme-court-lessig-faithlesselectors.html [perma.cc/2WMF-F4ZV].
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III. FIXING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
This Part evaluates solutions to the problems posed by the Electoral College. It begins with the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, a proposal
that would not abolish the College—clearly a constitutional amendment is required for that—but would change its operation so that the winner it produced
would, by definition, be the winner of the national popular vote. 76 After describing the Compact, this Part addresses the legal vulnerabilities and practical concerns it presents. It then turns to other prospects for Electoral College reform.
A. The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact
At the heart of this plan, which Wegman strongly supports as the most
viable path for reform, is an interstate compact under which each state agrees
to award all its electoral votes to the winner of the national popular vote rather
than to the winner of the state’s popular vote. The Compact has been around
in various forms since the 1970s, 77 but its current incarnation was crafted in
2004 by John Koza, a computer scientist and inventor whose background as
creator of the scratch-off lottery ticket made him an unlikely expert in interstate compacts (pp. 196–97). Koza’s 1,100-plus-page tome Every Vote Equal is
the enchiridion of the popular-vote compact, and in recent years that Compact
has been quietly amassing support in the states. To date, fifteen states and the
District of Columbia, representing 195 electoral votes, have enacted the Compact into law. 78 In nine additional states, one chamber has passed a bill approving the Compact. 79 By its terms, the Compact will go into effect when it
is adopted by states representing an additional seventy-five electoral votes, for a
total of 270 votes, the number required for an Electoral College majority. 80
Wegman’s journalistic chops are on full display in the passages describing
the unlikely team of advocates behind the Compact: Koza is a fascinating character; so is Ray Haynes, a former Republican state senator and one-term chair
of the American Legislative Exchange Council who now spends his days traveling the country persuading Republican lawmakers to join the Compact. 81

76. See Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote, supra
note 54.
77. P. 199; see also Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, How to Achieve Direct National Election of the President Without Amending the Constitution, FINDLAW (Dec. 28, 2001),
https://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/how-to-achieve-direct-national-election-of-thepresident-without-amending-the-constitution.html [perma.cc/7L6U-EF5W].
78. Status of National Popular Vote Bill in Each State, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, https://
www.nationalpopularvote.com/state-status [perma.cc/FRA8-SHNS]. The first state to join the
Compact was Maryland in 2007, in an effort led by first-term state senator Jamie Raskin. P. 210.
79. Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote, supra
note 54.
80. Id.
81. Pp. 190, 195. Haynes’s stump speech begins by reciting his conservative credentials
and then explaining why a system that “leads candidates for President, by necessity, to ignore 35
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Nevertheless, Wegman’s discussion of the Compact is the least convincing portion of the book. Wegman provides scant details on the work being
done to actually convince legislators. And if the effort contains any genuine
grassroots components, there are no signs of them. In addition, Wegman’s
enthusiasm for the Compact crowds out any meaningful grappling with the
legal and practical vulnerabilities of the plan. The book also sidelines other
prospects for change, both smaller-bore efforts like encouraging more states
to follow the lead of Maine and Nebraska in moving away from winner-takeall, and more ambitious reforms such as amending the Constitution.
These critiques notwithstanding, highlighting the work being done in
support of the Compact may prove valuable even if the Compact never goes
into effect. Constitutional change can be a slow and circuitous process; opening the eyes of a new generation of state activists and officials to the possibility
of change in presidential selection may well lay the foundation for eventual
constitutional amendment. 82
B. Legal and Practical Vulnerabilities
One major question about the Compact is whether it is constitutionally
suspect under the Compact Clause, which provides that “[n]o State shall,
without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact
with another State.” 83 Despite this facially clear congressional-consent language, the Supreme Court has suggested that consent is not required for all
interstate agreements, but only for those “tending to the increase of political
power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.” 84 And the Court has upheld multistate compacts—for example, the Multistate Tax Compact—that have not been
consented to by Congress. 85 So the Compact Clause may not be an insuperable
obstacle, even if states cannot secure congressional consent. But it is certainly
a potential complication that merits serious consideration.
The Compact could also be vulnerable to challenge on the grounds that
awarding a state’s electoral votes to someone the state’s voters have not se-

to 45 states across the country if they wish to win the presidency . . . is not good for the presidency and not good for the country.” See Ray Haynes, Testimony Before the Michigan Legislature
on the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/sites/default/files/haynes-testimony-2018-9-6.pdf [perma.cc/Y2UE-9RLN].
82. Cf. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Essay, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 374 (2007) (describing what the authors term “democratic constitutionalism” as a mode of constitutional change “sustained by traditions of popular
engagement that authorize citizens to make claims about the Constitution’s meaning . . . through
constitutional lawmaking, electoral politics, and the institutions of civil society”).
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
84. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893).
85. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 469 (1978).
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lected functionally erases the votes of those individuals and is thus inconsistent with the principle of one person, one vote. 86 It could also be subject to
challenge under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 2 provides
that when the right to vote, including for “the choice of electors for President
and Vice President of the United States,” is “denied” or “abridged,” a state’s
congressional representation is reduced accordingly. 87 There is no relevant
case law on Section 2, 88 but voters who objected to the Compact could theoretically ask the courts or Congress to reduce the congressional representation
of a state whose award of electors to the national-popular-vote winner conflicts with the preference of the majority of voters in that state.
There could also be a general argument that the Compact is inconsistent
with constitutional design and practice. The Framers rejected the idea of a direct popular election for president, the argument would run, and states have
not previously sought to appoint presidential electors on the basis of votes cast
outside the state, rendering this innovation suspect. 89
None of these problems is necessarily fatal, and there is a real possibility
that a court would decline to resolve any such case on political-question
grounds. 90 But the arguments are not frivolous, and the prospect of litigation
under one or more of these theories is important to consider in evaluating the
Compact.
The Compact also presents serious questions of implementation and enforceability. What if a state adopts the Compact, then withdraws or attempts
to withdraw after Election Day? On its face the Compact forbids states from
withdrawing after July 20 of an election year (p. 202). But there’s no real enforcement mechanism, and in any event it is not clear that this term would
prevent one organ of state government from attempting to send to Congress
a competing slate of electors that tracks the state’s popular vote rather than
the national popular vote. The states that have joined the Compact have enacted it like any ordinary legislation, so a state actor in this scenario would be
engaged in plainly lawless activity. But in our hyperpolarized moment, it is

86. See Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 819 (1969) (“The idea that one group can be
granted greater voting strength than another is hostile to the one man, one vote basis of our
representative government.”).
87. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
88. The Supreme Court’s most important precedent on Section 2, Richardson v. Ramirez,
read Section 2 to permit states to disenfranchise felons. 418 U.S. 24 (1974). But Richardson did
not touch upon the circumstances in which the Section 2 penalty of reduced representation
might actually be triggered. See Franita Tolson, What Is Abridgment? A Critique of Two Section
Twos, 67 ALA. L. REV. 433, 434 (2015) (“Congress has never imposed Section 2’s penalty on offending states . . . .”).
89. See Samuel Issacharoff & Trevor Morrison, Constitution by Convention, 108 CALIF. L.
REV. 1913, 1935 (2020).
90. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019) (“Federal judges have
no license to reallocate political power between the two major political parties, with no plausible grant of authority in the Constitution, and no legal standards to limit and direct their decisions.”).
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not hard to imagine a governor siding with a co-partisan presidential candidate and seeking to award that candidate, rather than the national-popularvote winner, the state’s electors. Indeed, a governor pursuing such a strategy
would presumably argue that the Compact itself undermines popular sovereignty by disregarding the will of the state electorate in favor of the preferences
of voters in other states.
Once again, it is not clear that any of this would happen. But it could. And
as we have seen, such uncertainty creates real danger in the context of a close
or disputed presidential election.
C. Other Paths to Reform
Wegman’s focus on the Compact means that he does not explore other
reform possibilities. Two omissions are particularly conspicuous: the prospect
of state-level reforms and the possibility of constitutional amendment.
Wegman is quick to dismiss the adoption of non-winner-take-all allocation schemes like the “congressional district method” used in Maine and Nebraska. 91 When Maine adopted this method in 1969 in response to the same
fears that drove Bayh’s contemporaneous efforts at constitutional amendment, it believed that other states would follow suit. 92 But so far only Nebraska
has done so, in 1992, the result of a campaign by longtime state senator and
former civil rights leader Ernie Chambers. 93
Other states might consider doing the same. Wegman worries that gerrymandered congressional districts mean that a district allocation scheme could
be even worse than winner-take-all (p. 183). But he does not consider the limits state courts have imposed on permissible gerrymandering in states like
Pennsylvania and North Carolina, 94 or the fact that states like Arizona use independent redistricting commissions. 95 A move by additional states to join
Maine and Nebraska would not entirely eliminate the problems with the College, but it would at least mitigate the effective political erasure of large swaths

91. See pp. 185–87; James Doubek, How State Sen. Ernie Chambers Helped Keep Nebraska’s Electoral College Votes Split, NPR (Nov. 9, 2020, 6:26 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/11
/09/933215552/how-state-sen-ernie-chambers-helped-keep-nebraskas-electoral-college-votessplit [perma.cc/Z4DX-7TU4].
92. Meilan Solly, Why Do Maine and Nebraska Split Their Electoral Votes?, SMITHSONIAN
(Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/why-do-maine-and-nebraskasplit-their-electoral-votes-180976219 [perma.cc/LC8V-JTR3]; Paul Mills, The History of Maine’s
Distinctive Electoral College Voting System, CENT. ME. (Oct. 9, 2016), https://www.centralmaine.com/2016/10/09/paul-mills-the-history-of-maines-distinctive-electoral-college-voting-system [perma.cc/Z9K7-TFXQ].
93. Doubek, supra note 91.
94. Jonathan Lai, The Legal Team in the Pa. Gerrymandering Case Set Their Sights on N.C.
They Just Won Again., PHILA. INQUIRER (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/politics/pennsylvania/nc-gerrymandering-case-used-pa-model-20190904.html [perma.cc/P678-GZMX].
95. See, e.g., JOSEPH KANEFIELD & MARY O’GRADY, ARIZONA INDEPENDENT
REDISTRICTING COMMISSION LEGAL OVERVIEW (2011), https://irc.az.gov/sites/default/files/media
/AZ-Independent-Redistricting-Commission-Legal-Overview-070811.pdf [perma.cc/UBJ4-L2F6].
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of the country. And it could change or at least complicate the partisan valence
of reform debates today.
The political obstacles to implementing such a change are daunting. The
party that prevailed in the most recent cycle would presumably resist an effort
that might deprive it of electoral votes at the next election. (This, of course, is
an important rationale for the Compact.) But if the possibility of unilateral
adoption seems a bridge too far, perhaps states could proceed in pairs as they
implement this change: the safe Democratic stronghold of New York with
the increasingly conservative, once-consummate swing state of Florida, for
example.
Regarding a potential constitutional amendment, Wegman points to the
failure of amendment efforts during less polarized times to conclude that “a
constitutional amendment is not in the cards” in today’s hyperpolarized moment (p. 21). Wegman is of course right that changing the presidential-selection process through an Article V amendment, which requires a two-thirds
vote in the House and the Senate and ratification in three-fourths of the states,
would be extraordinarily difficult. 96 That’s particularly true because the partisan benefits of today’s status quo are strongly asymmetrical: Republican politicians benefit from the College’s distortions, while changing demographic
and political dynamics mean that Democrats are likely to continue enjoying
an edge in the national popular vote. 97 But that is no reason not to undertake
a serious effort. A recent article by David Pozen and Thomas Schmidt suggests
that the two chambers of Congress do not need to act contemporaneously in
the amendment process, so that the popular-vote amendment passed by the
House in 1969 might still be live and ready for Senate action. 98 Adopting this
view would mean that an amendment process would not need to start from
scratch—though of course here the obstacle of the Senate would, if anything,
be more daunting than it was in 1970.
Still, it is striking how often presidential selection and succession, as well
as expansion of the franchise, have been the subjects of amendment: the
Twentieth Amendment moved the start of the president’s term and provided
for succession, the Twenty-Second Amendment limited the president to two
terms, the Twenty-Third Amendment gave the District of Columbia electoral

96. Article V’s process would be required; the Electoral College is a constitutional creation that it is difficult to see subjecting to amendment through interpretation, or outside of Article V. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 267–68 (1991).
97. See Press Release, Rep. Thomas Massie et. al, Joint Statement Concerning January 6
Attempt to Overturn the Result of the Election (Jan. 3, 2021), https://massie.house.gov/news
/email/show.aspx?ID=Z5MPA3CVK5FYZQ3KBYQIDSAWB4 [perma.cc/2PFFQCC4] (“From
a purely partisan perspective, Republican presidential candidates have won the national popular
vote only once in the last 32 years. They have therefore depended on the electoral college for
nearly all presidential victories in the last generation.”).
98. Pp. 152–59; see David E. Pozen & Thomas P. Schmidt, The Puzzles and Possibilities of
Article V, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 2317, 2392 & n.422 (2021); see also Julie C. Suk, Opening the Paths
of Constitutional Change, DEMOCRACY, Summer 2021, https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/61/opening-the-paths-of-constitutional-change [perma.cc/ZWA5-VBYT].
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votes, and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment created procedures for responding
to presidential incapacity or disability. Indeed, of the post–Bill of Rights
amendments to the Constitution, nearly a third have involved the presidency.
Perhaps more significantly, despite political opposition and the difficulty of
amending the Constitution, we have managed to substantively expand the
electorate in that same period through the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, TwentyFourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments.
Other efforts at formal amendment have faced rocky paths, including in
polarized times. 99 A half century elapsed between women’s initial attempts to
achieve suffrage under the Constitution and the eventual passage and ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment. 100 The recent ERA revival movement
could yet result in writing sex equality into the Constitution, despite the ERA
having sat dormant for decades. 101 And as the ERA effort also reveals, sustained attention on constitutional amendment can galvanize other types of
reform, including subconstitutional or state-level change. Whatever the final
result, the momentum around reviving the ERA suggests that Electoral College abolition should not be off the table. Ending the Electoral College once
and for all is emphatically a project that deserves continued attention and engagement—in Congress, state houses, civil society, and the streets. 102
CONCLUSION
Closing the chapter on the Electoral College will undoubtedly require
great political will. And it is possible that we’ve become inured to its distortions and dysfunction at the same time that we have lost the habit of meaningful democratic reform and constitutional amendment. 103 We last amended
the Constitution in 1992, which means that young people, including most law
students, have not seen a constitutional amendment in their lifetimes. (Even
for those old enough to remember it, the Twenty-Seventh Amendment was
hardly a moment of profound constitutional transformation.) At only two
other periods in American history—the sixty-one years between the Twelfth
and Thirteenth Amendments, and the forty-three years between the Fifteenth
and Sixteenth Amendments—have we gone so long without changing the
99. See Michael S. Kang, Hyperpartisan Gerrymandering, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1379, 1382
(2020) (“Congressional polarization for most of American history was comparable to today’s
levels of hyperpartisanship, and voters were nearly as loyal to their parties as they are now.”).
100. Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism,
and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 951 (2002).
101. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, House Votes to Extend Deadline to Ratify Equal Rights Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/13/us/politics/equalrights-amendment.html [perma.cc/2LAE-7V3K]. See generally JULIE C. SUK, WE THE WOMEN:
THE UNSTOPPABLE MOTHERS OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT (2020).
102. See Andrea Scoseria Katz, The Lost Promise of Progressive Formalism, 99 TEX. L. REV.
679 (2021).
103. See Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1741 (2007)
(“We have lost our ability to write down our new constitutional commitments in the old-fashioned way.”).
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written constitution. As for the College specifically, despite centuries of reform efforts, the Twelfth Amendment remains the only successful effort at
constitutional change (p. 92).
But at previous points in our history, when our institutions have been insufficient to match the political and moral values of an inclusive and representative democracy, we have fixed the Constitution. 104 We should endeavor
to do the same today, particularly in light of the experiences of 2016 and 2020.
One significant contribution of Wegman’s book is to reveal just how much
reform energy has been directed at the College from the start—energy that we
should now harness in pushing both for constitutional amendment and subconstitutional change.
The presidency is a massively powerful institution. We can debate the desirability of that power and its consistency with constitutional design, but no
one should want an unchecked president. It is a truism that the people represent the ultimate check on the president. As long as we have the Electoral College, that is no meaningful check at all.

104. See generally RICHARD ALBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: MAKING,
BREAKING, AND CHANGING CONSTITUTIONS (2019).

